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Determinants of sell-side financial analysts’
use of non-financial information
Raf Orens and Nadine Lybaert*
Abstract— This paper aims to research the context within which sell-side financial analysts make decisions to use corporate
non-financial information. Prior research has demonstrated that financial analysts take into account non-financial information
in their analyses of firms, but knowledge is scarce about what determines their use of this information. Based on a survey
conducted among Belgian financial analysts, we observe a significant negative association between the financial analysts’ use
of non-financial information and the earnings informativeness of a firm’s financial statement information proxied by leverage
and stock return volatility. We also find that a higher amount of non-financial information is used by less experienced
financial analysts and by financial analysts covering a higher number of firms.
Keywords: financial analysts; market for information; non-financial information
1. Introduction
The quality, relevance and timeliness of corporate
information are important issues in the efficient
functioning of capital markets. A critical element in
this respect is an efficient flow of information
among capital market participants as firms, invest-
ors or financial analysts (Barker, 1998; Holland and
Johanson, 2003). Traditionally, financial statement
information has been useful in assessing firms.
However, current trends, such as globalisation, the
introduction of new technologies and new busi-
nesses, and the transition towards a knowledge
economy, decrease the value relevance of financial
statement information. Financial analysts and
investors have been observed to rely on information
beyond the financial statements (i.e. non-financial
information) to judge firm value (Amir and Lev,
1996; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Lev and Zarowin,
1999; Graham et al., 2002; Liang and Yao, 2005).
Our paper investigates the behaviour of financial
analysts in their use of non-financial information.
Financial analysts are primary users of corporate
information (Schipper, 1991), and are representa-
tives of the investment community for which the
reporting of corporate information is primarily
intended (IASB, 2005). Prior research has shown
that investors rely strongly on financial analysts’
earnings forecasts, recommendations and reported
information (Hirst et al., 1995; Ackert et al., 1996;
Womack, 1996). We examine in detail the drivers of
the financial analysts’ use of non-financial infor-
mation and propose that the usage of such infor-
mation increases with a decrease in the information
content of the firm’s earnings, proxied by firm
leverage and stock return volatility. This propos-
ition is consistent with the two most important
functions of financial analysts: releasing informa-
tion to investors and monitoring firm management
(Chen et al., 2002). The importance of both
functions is increasing with a decrease in the
earnings informativeness. We further propose that
the financial analysts’ use of non-financial infor-
mation is associated with their experience and task
complexity. Since the theoretical justification of the
determinants that drive the financial analysts’
decision to use non-financial information is scarce,
subsequent research could use the insights of our
study to develop testable hypotheses.
We focus our study on Belgian sell-side financial
analysts covering Belgian listed firms. The Belgian
financial reporting environment is similar to that of
other continental European countries. A common
characteristic is the lower quality of financial
statement information due to lower levels of
enforcement, earnings management practices, con-
centrated ownership structures and less developed
equity markets (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Leuz et
al., 2003). Belgian brokerage firms face market
characteristics similar to those experienced in other
small continental European countries (e.g. Austria)
and Scandinavian countries (e.g. Denmark or
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Finland) (Bolliger, 2004). In particular, Belgian
brokerage firms employ a similar number of
financial analysts, and these financial analysts
have comparable levels of experience and task
complexity (Bolliger, 2004).
To observe financial analysts’ use of non-finan-
cial information, we conduct a survey among these
stakeholders. This approach allows us to collect
primary data but it has the disadvantages that
responses are received which may not correspond
with actual practice, or that the respondents may not
comprehend the questions, or that responses cannot
be explored in more detail. To deal with these
disadvantages, our questionnaire has been read and
reviewed by four experts in the field to identify
whether all questions were comprehensible. In
addition, we have performed content analysis on
the reports written by financial analysts as a
robustness check on the questionnaire results.
Our results show that Belgian sell-side financial
analysts often use non-financial information in
assessing firms. Consistent with our propositions,
we demonstrate that financial analysts following
firms with higher stock return volatility and firms
with higher leverage use more non-financial infor-
mation. Financial analysts’ experience and task
complexity are also related to their use of non-
financial information. Our empirical findings
should be of interest to regulators (i.e. standard-
setters or stock exchanges) as they have to evaluate
whether current reporting requirements, which
mainly have a financial focus, are sufficient to
meet the information needs of capital market
participants. Regulators face difficulties in setting
non-financial information requirements as the
importance of non-financial information depends
on firm and industry characteristics (e.g. Skinner,
2008; Stark, 2008). A common framework includ-
ing non-financial information would be irrelevant
for all firms in assisting investors or financial
analysts in assessing firms (Stark, 2008). Our results
seem to be in line with these statements. We find
that the emphasis placed on non-financial informa-
tion by financial analysts depends on the nature of
the firms covered. In other words, firm-specific
factors drive the relevance of non-financial infor-
mation for financial analysts.
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 reviews relevant prior literature
and Section 3 develops our research propositions.
The research design is explained in Section 4 and
the research results are discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 presents sensitivity tests. Section 7
summarises the paper and provides some questions
for further research.
2. The relevance of non-financial
information
The importance and relevance of non-financial
information in decision-making has been the sub-
ject of prior studies. However, many provide only
some examples of non-financial information
metrics, (e.g. Said et al., 2003; Juntilla et al.,
2005), rather than a clear definition of non-financial
information. The definition of ‘non-financial infor-
mation’ that we follow here is included in the
special report to the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) on business and financial
reporting (Upton, 2001: 5), stating that ‘non-
financial disclosures and metrics include index
scores, ratios, counts and other information not
presented in the basic financial statements’. The
basic financial statements are the balance sheet, the
income statement, the notes, the cash flow statement
and the stockholders’ equity statement (IAS 1.8,
IASB, 2005). Authors such as Robb et al. (2001),
Amir et al. (2003) and Flöstrand (2006) also define
non-financial information in this way. Amir and Lev
(1996) define non-financial information as non-
accounting information. According to Barker and
Imam (2008), non-accounting information is all
information drawn from outside the financial state-
ments. This approach differs slightly from Upton’s
definition. For instance an earnings forecast, being a
metric published outside financial statements, is
considered as non-financial information according
to Upton’s definition but, following Barker and
Imam, this is considered to be financial information
because an earnings forecast is drawn from financial
statements.
Several studies have emerged on the value
relevance of corporate non-financial information,
using archival data. The first approach described
here is seen in the stream of literature that examines
the usefulness of non-financial performance meas-
urements to predict future earnings or firm market
values. Amir and Lev (1996) demonstrate that share
prices are associated with the non-financial indica-
tors ‘Population in a service area’ and ‘Market
penetration’. Hirschey et al. (2001) find that non-
financial information on patent quality affects stock
prices. Banker et al. (2000) show that non-financial
measures of customer satisfaction are related to
future financial performance. Ittner and Larcker
(1998) find the same association, but in their study
customer satisfaction does not have an influence on
market returns. Kallapur and Kwan (2004) show
that recognised brand values affect firm values.
A second approach to determining the relevance
of corporate non-financial information is to exam-
ine the impact of non-financial disclosure on the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 04 ABR Orens.3d Page 40 of 54
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quality of financial analysts’ earnings estimates.
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) find a positive association
between financial analysts’ earnings forecast accur-
acy and forward-looking disclosure. Barron et al.
(1999) demonstrate that better quality information
included in the Management Discussion and
Analysis enhances the accuracy of the analysts’
earnings forecasts. These findings support
Opdyke’s (2000) argument that a strong focus by
financial analysts on financial data does not yield
accurate earnings forecasts. Orens and Lybaert
(2007) show that financial analysts using more
forward-looking information, as well as informa-
tion about innovation and research and develop-
ment, make smaller errors in estimating future
earnings. These results confirm the survey findings
of Epstein and Palepu (1999) and Eccles et al.
(2001) showing that financial statements are insuf-
ficient for meeting financial analysts’ information
needs.
A third approach determines the relevance of
non-financial information by examining the extent
to which financial analysts use such information. To
discover this, content analysis is often applied to
analysts’ reports. Rogers and Grant (1997), Breton
and Taffler (2001), García-Meca (2005), Flöstrand
(2006), García-Meca and Martinez (2007) and
Orens and Lybaert (2007) find that a substantial
proportion of an analysts’ report includes non-
financial information. Flöstrand (2006) also shows
that analysts’ reports issued for firms in the
pharmaceutical industry and the telecommunica-
tions industry contain more intellectual capital
information compared with analysts’ reports on
energy firms. Conversely, Barker and Imam (2008)
find that industry membership does not affect the
relative use of accounting and non-accounting
keywords to describe earnings quality. García-
Meca and Martinez (2007) find that the amount of
non-financial information in the analysts’ reports
increases with profitability and with growth oppor-
tunities. Applying protocol analysis, Bouwman et
al. (1995) demonstrate that financial analysts collect
non-financial information to gain a better insight
into firm performance and to observe unusual facts.
Dempsey et al. (1997) conduct a survey among
financial analysts, finding that financial analysts
often use non-financial performance measurements
to assess firms.
Despite the increasing importance of non-finan-
cial information, such information is hard to
mandate and to standardise due to the firm- and
industry-specific nature of non-financial informa-
tion, the disclosure costs (e.g. competitive costs)
and the risk of receiving vague and uninformative
disclosure (Skinner, 2008; Stark, 2008). Voluntary
non-financial disclosure is considered to be more
effective in improving the efficient functioning of
capital markets rather than mandating non-financial
disclosure (Skinner, 2008). Increased information
requirements are additionally detrimental for small
listed firms as they lack the financial resources to
provide this information (Bushee and Leuz, 2005;
Ahmed and Schneible, 2007; Gomes et al., 2007).
Based on a survey among financial analysts,
corporate managers and investors, Eccles and
Mavrinac (1995) find no support for regulatory
requirement of non-financial information. Various
initiatives have therefore recommended firms to
disclose non-financial information voluntarily. For
instance, the Jenkins Committee of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA,
1994) concluded that users are unable to assess
firms based on traditional financial statement infor-
mation. The AICPA (1994) developed a business
reporting model which includes non-financial infor-
mation that firms could report voluntarily. The
FASB (2001) extended this reporting model by the
inclusion of intangible-related information.
3. Research propositions
Despite the empirical findings discussed in the
previous section, additional research is required to
understand the context within which financial
analysts make decisions to use corporate non-
financial information in assessing a firm’s current
financial position, in estimating a firm’s earnings or
in recommending investment in a stock. In this
section, we develop our research propositions
which are based on judgments and prior empirical
research rather than on theoretical foundations.
These propositions are tentative and need to be
elaborated in future research. We first develop
propositions based on the characteristics of the
firms that are included in the financial analyst’s
portfolio. We then construct research propositions
about two demographic characteristics of financial
analysts, namely their experience and the complex-
ity of their portfolio.
3.1. Characteristics of firms
We assume that financial analysts use a higher
amount of non-financial information when follow-
ing firms whose current earnings are less informa-
tive. If they are less informative, current earnings
are less related to future earnings, future cash flows
or security prices (Martikainen, 1997; Hodgson and
Stevenson-Clarke, 2000; Skinner, 2008). As current
financial statement information is less indicative of
future company results, financial analysts and
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investors are expected to collect additional infor-
mation in order to interpret current earnings and to
estimate future firm performance and firm value
(Das et al., 1998; Eccles et al., 2001; Amir et al.,
2003). Non-financial information is thereby used to
add meaning to accounting data and to assess the
quality of current earnings (Barker and Imam,
2008). The increased use of non-financial informa-
tion where there is a reduction in earnings
informativeness is consistent with the two most
important functions of financial analysts, namely
releasing information to investors and monitoring
corporate management (Chen et al., 2002).
The first role of financial analysts is to provide
reliable information to investors (Jorge and Rees,
1998; Barker, 2000; Cheng et al., 2006). Analysts
add value to investors by transforming a relatively
large amount of publicly available information into
useful and relevant information for investment
decisions (Hong et al., 2000; Elgers et al., 2001).
Hayes (1998) asserts that the efforts devoted by
financial analysts to collecting information depend
on the trading commissions that could be generated.
Since investors are risk averse, a decrease in the
information content of earnings increases the will-
ingness of investors to rely on financial analysts to
become informed about a firm, increasing the
financial analysts’ contribution to investors (Amir
et al., 2003). Analysts have more incentives to
collect information since the provision of more
information supporting analysts’ recommendations
increases investors’ willingness to trade (Hong et
al., 2000). In addition, investors are often unfamiliar
with the interpretation of non-financial information
(Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Maines et al., 2002;
Hoff andWood, 2008) due to the non-comparability
of this information across firms (Maines et al.,
2002). Investors rely on financial analysts to
become informed (Eccles and Crane, 1988; Amir
et al., 1999; Hoff and Wood, 2008), increasing the
incentives for financial analysts to collect non-
financial information.
Firm monitoring is the second important function
of financial analysts. By assessing firms, analysts
are able to reduce agency problems between
shareholders and corporate management (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Chung and Jo, 1996; Doukas
et al., 2000). Where earnings are less informative,
agency problems between investors and corporate
management increase (Chung et al., 2005; Jiraporn
and Gleason, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008). The
increased agency costs are mitigated by the moni-
toring role of financial analysts (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Moyer et al., 1989). To perform
their monitoring role, financial analysts have to rely
more on corporate non-financial information where
there is decreasing earnings informativeness.
We conclude that financial analysts are assumed
to use more non-financial information when the
information content of a firm’s earnings is lower.
In our study, earnings informativeness is proxied
indirectly by identifying factors that have been
shown to affect the information content of earn-
ings.1 Firth et al. (2007) show that earnings
informativeness is associated with risk and growth
opportunities, which may be proxied by the market-
to-book ratio (García-Meca and Martinez, 2007).
We do not include this variable in our analyses
because the market-to-book ratio is considered as a
proxy for the use of non-financial information by
capital market participants (Hossain et al., 2005),
which biases our research findings. Risk is an
indication of uncertainty, allowing financial ana-
lysts to gain from the acquisition of information
(García-Meca and Martinez, 2007). Proxies for
risks that are often employed in the empirical
literature in association with the information con-
tent of earnings are firm size, leverage and stock
return volatility (Warfield et al., 1995; Lui et al.,
2007). Size, in association with the use of non-
financial information, can however bias our results.
Although smaller firms are considered to be more
risky, whichmay increase financial analysts’ need to
collect and use non-financial data, smaller firms
seem to disclose a lower amount of non-financial
information compared to larger firms (Lang and
Lundholm, 1993; Vanstraelen et al., 2003). This
implies easier access to non-financial information
for financial analysts covering larger firms com-
pared to smaller firms, facilitating the use of non-
financial information for financial analysts follow-
ing larger firms (García-Meca and Martinez, 2007).
Hence, firm size may have a positive or a negative
association with the use of non-financial informa-
tion. Following the empirical literature, the acces-
sibility to non-financial information is unrelated to a
firm’s leverage or a firm’s stock return volatility
(e.g. Depoers, 2000; Ettredge et al., 2002; Gul and
Leung, 2004). Hence, we decide to use the latter
measurements as proxies for the level of earnings
informativeness.
Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000) find that
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investors perceive earnings disclosed by firms with
higher leverage to be less informative due to the
increased likelihood of firm failure and earnings
management. In a similar way, Watts and
Zimmerman (1990) assert that the level of earnings
management correlates with firm leverage. Duke
and Hunt (1990) and Press and Weintrop (1990)
show empirically that higher leveraged firms to a
larger extent apply income-increasing accounting
methods. Managers of these firms have to report
earnings that are high enough to cover interest,
amortisation, and dividends. Hence, the earnings
informativeness decreases with an increase in firm
leverage (Dhaliwal et al., 1991; Martikainen, 1997;
Yeo et al., 2002; Petra, 2007). The informativeness
of financial statement information also decreases
with an increase in the variability of a firm’s stock
returns (Lipe, 1990; Warfield et al., 1995; Vafeas,
2000). Large stock price changes reflect larger
changes in a firm’s financial performance, increas-
ing the uncertainty around future earnings. Since an
inverse association exists between earnings infor-
mativeness on the one hand and firm leverage and
stock return volatility on the other hand, we propose
that financial analysts use a larger amount of non-
financial information covering firms with higher
leverage and higher stock return volatility, leading
to the following research propositions:
RP 1: Financial analysts’ use of non-financial
information is positively associated with
the mean leverage of the firms followed by
the financial analysts.
RP 2: Financial analysts’ use of non-financial
information is positively associated with
the mean volatility in stock returns of the
firms followed by the financial analysts.
3.2. Demographic characteristics of analysts
Next, we develop two propositions related to
financial analysts’ experience and task complexity.
Perkins and Rao (1990) and Hunton and McEwen
(1997) observe that experts, in comparison to
novices, have more cognitive structures allowing
them to structure problems effectively. Less experi-
enced decision-makers follow an opportunistic
approach by collecting and examining all available
information in a chronological manner. The more
experienced financial analysts conduct a more
sophisticated information search (Yates, 1990).
They spend less time, and are more directed, in
searching for information since they collect only
information from a predetermined list of informa-
tion items (Bouwman et al., 1987; Anderson, 1988;
Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Frederickson and
Miller, 2004). These findings allow us to propose
that less experienced financial analysts use a higher
amount of non-financial information. Hence, we
state that:
RP 3: Financial analysts’ use of non-financial
information is negatively associated with
the experience of the financial analysts.
Financial analysts’ use of corporate information
also depends on task complexity (Plumlee, 2003).
In our study, we proxy task complexity as the
number of firms financial analysts follow. An
increase in the number of firms reduces the time
left to devote to each individual firm (Clement,
1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Brown, 2001), decreasing
the complexity of the decision-makers’ evaluation
techniques and restricting the decision-makers’
need to collect and use information (Paquette and
Kida, 1988; Payn et al., 1992; Libby et al., 2002).
As the efforts to collect information reduce with
task complexity, we assume that financial analysts
use a lower amount of non-financial information
when they cover a higher number of firms.
On the other hand, an interview with a financial
analyst informs us that financial analysts covering a
smaller number of firms normally perform other
tasks besides evaluating listed firms, such as taking
sales orders or making direct client contacts, which
reduce the time left to analyse the firms in their
portfolio in detail. As a consequence, the use of
non-financial information is restricted. Since the
direction of the association between the use of non-
financial information and task complexity is
unclear, we posit the following research propos-
ition:
RP 4: Financial analysts’ use of non-financial
information is associated with the number
of firms they follow.
4. Research design
4.1. Measurement of the use of non-financial
information by financial analysts
In this study we make use of survey data as a proxy
for the financial analysts’ use of non-financial
information. Surveys have the advantage that
primary data can be collected about the behaviour
of financial analysts with regard to non-financial
information. The survey method is helpful to
provide insight into the black box created by
archival studies which are inappropriate for observ-
ing the actual use of non-financial information by
financial analysts. The survey has the disadvantages
that responses are received which may not corres-
pond with actual practice, that the respondents may
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not comprehend the questions or that responses
cannot be delved into in more detail. To deal with
these disadvantages, our questionnaire has been
proofread by two financial analysts and two
academics to identify whether all questions were
comprehensible. In addition, we have performed
content analysis to the reports written by financial
analysts as a robustness check for the questionnaire
results. We detail the design of the content analysis
approach in Section 5.2.
The non-financial information indicators
included in the questionnaire are based on the
recommendations contained in the reports AICPA
(1994) and FASB (2001). Studies such as Rogers
and Grant (1997), Robb et al. (2001) and
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) also use these recommen-
dations to construct their disclosure index. Using an
existing disclosure index increases the validity of
our research findings.
In 1994 the AICPA proposed a reporting model
which included relevant corporate information,
financial as well as non-financial, that users require
in making investment decisions. This reporting
model consists of a limited number of recommen-
dations classified into five information categories:
business data, management’s analysis of financial
and non-financial data, forward-looking informa-
tion, information about management and share-
holders and background information about the firm.
All categories include non-financial measurements,
but the category ‘business data’ also contains
financial indicators. In 1998, the FASB studied the
AICPA recommendations in order to enhance firms’
corporate reporting practices. FASB (2001)
extended the AICPA disclosure index by adding a
sixth information category which consisted of non-
financial information about firms’ intangible assets.
Unlike AICPA (1994), FASB (2001) did not
provide an exhaustive list of information items
that firms might disclose.
The disclosure index applied in our questionnaire
includes 71 non-financial information items which
are selected from both discussed papers, and which
firms may disclose voluntarily.2 The items are
grouped into five non-financial information cat-
egories:
. Management’s analysis of financial and non-
financial data (ANA): 11 items;
. Forward-looking information (FWL): 11 items;
. Information about management and shareholders
(MAN): 6 items;
. Background information about the firm (BI): 23
items;
. Intellectual capital information (IC): 20 items.
The items from the categories ANA, FWL,
MAN and BI are all non-financial information
indicators included in the corresponding informa-
tion categories discussed in AICPA (1994). The
items mentioned in the category IC are derived
from the non-financial information items included
in the category ‘business data’ from AICPA (1994)
together with indicators from the sixth information
category of FASB (2001) regarding firms’ intan-
gible assets. Table 1 presents all non-financial
information items included in the disclosure index
of our study.
In our survey, each financial analyst was asked to
indicate on a five-point Likert scale3 the extent to
which each item is used in the analysis of all firms
followed. This methodology biases the results to
some extent since the use of corporate non-financial
information by financial analysts may differ
between the firms they analyse. Ideally, we should
have asked each financial analyst to indicate the use
of corporate non-financial information for each firm
separately, but probably respondents would have
been deterred by the length of the survey and would
have been reluctant to provide so much detailed
information about each firm. Similar to Dempsey et
al. (1997), we asked financial analysts to indicate
their average use of information. The sample size of
our study consists of 31 responses, which is a
response rate of 63% out of the population of
49 sell-side financial analysts employed by Belgian
brokerage houses in 2005.
4.2. Regression model
The following multivariate regression model asso-
ciates analysts’ use of non-financial information to
the independent variables:
USEij ¼ b0 þ b1 LEVi þ b2 SDRi þ b3 EXPi
þ b4 NCOMi þ e
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2 In Belgium, firms are required to disclose relevant non-
financial performance measurements (about, e.g. environmental
performance or human resources information), research and
development, shareholder structure, corporate governance and
risks.
3 The scores in the questionnaire were arranged as follows: 1
= always used; 2 = often used; 3 = sometimes used; 4 = rarely
used and 5 = never used. In order to facilitate the interpretation
of our results – so that a higher score suggests a higher use of
non-financial information – we have recoded our results as
follows: 0 = never used; 1 = rarely used; 2 = sometimes used; 3 =
often used and 4 = always used.
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With:
USEij = average use of non-financial informa-
tion by financial analyst i from the
information category j, with j represent-
ing the average use of all 71 non-
financial information items (TOT) and
the average use of the five components
of non-financial information, i.e. the
categories ANA, FWL, MAN, BI and
IC.
LEVi = average ratio of long- and short-term
debt to total assets of the firms followed
by financial analyst i
SDRi = average standard deviation in daily
stock returns of the firms followed by
financial analyst i
EXPi = number of years that financial analyst i
performs his/her profession
NCOMi = number of firms followed by financial
analyst i
ε = error term
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Table 1
Overview of the 71 non-financial information items included in the disclosure index
Category ANA: Management’s analysis of financial and non-financial data
Reasons for changes in the financial, operating and performance-related data
Reasons identified by the management for changes in the volume of units sold or in revenues
Reasons identified by the management for changes in innovation
Reasons identified by the management for changes in profitability
Reasons identified by the management for changes in the long-term financial position
Reasons identified by the management for changes in the short-term liquidity and financial flexibility
Unusual or nonrecurring events and the effect of them on the firm
The identity and past effect of key trends
Social trends and the past effect of them on the firm
Demographic trends and the past effect of them on the firm
Political trends and the past effect of them on the firm
Macro-economic trends and the past effect of them on the firm
Regulatory trends and the past effect of them on the firm
Category FWL: Forward-looking information
Future risks for the firm
Future opportunities for the firm
Effects of the risks and opportunities on the business’s future earnings and future cash flows
Activities and plans to meet the broad objectives and business strategy
Conditions that must occur within the business that management believes must be present to meet the broad
objectives and business strategy
Conditions that must occur in the external environment that management believes must be present to meet
the broad objectives and business strategy
Comparison of actual business performance to previously disclosed opportunities, risks and plans of the firm
New products launched in the next years
Expectations about the future growth of the firm
Evolution of futuremacro-economic indicators (e.g. economic climate, exchange rates) and the effect on thefirm
Future production capacity of the firm
Category MAN: Information about management and shareholders
Directors and executive management
Major shareholder(s) of the firm’s stock
Number of shares owned by the directors, managers or employees
Director and executive management compensation
Transactions and relationships among stakeholders and the firm
Disagreement with directors, auditors, bankers not associated with the firm
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Table 1
Overview of the 71 non-financial information items included in the disclosure index (continued)
Category BI: Background information about the firm
Broad objectives and strategy
Broad objectives of the firm
Broad strategies of the firm
Consistency or inconsistency of the strategy with key trends affecting the business
Scope and description of business and properties
Industry in which the business participates
General development of the business
Principal products and services
Principal markets and market segments
Processes used to make and render principal products and services
Seasonality and cyclicality of the firm
Existing laws that have an influence on the business
Macroeconomic activity
Major contractual relationships with customers and suppliers
Location and productive capacity of the firm’s principal plants
Impact of industry structure on the firm
Major suppliers of a firm
Availability or scarcity of supply of products or services
Relative bargaining power of suppliers
Dominant customers of the firm
Extent that the business is dispersed among its customers
Relative bargaining power of customers
Major competitors of a firm
Intensity of the competition
Competitive position
Ability of new firms to enter the business
Category IC: Intellectual capital information
Human capital
Compensation of employees
Education and training programmes of employees
Level of expertise of the employees
Staff policy
Job rotation
Employee satisfaction
Quality of the management
Internal structure
Productivity of a firm
Innovation (e.g. new products, new production processes)
Important patents, trademarks or licenses
Research and development programmes
Quality of the products or services
Organisation structure
Technological know how
Time required to perform activities such as production, delivery of products, development of new products
External structure
Evolution in the market share
Main brands of the firm
Customer satisfaction or customer loyalty
Realised acquisitions
Distribution and delivery methods
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We use two data sources to measure our independ-
ent variables. The Bel-First database4 provides us
with firm-specific data of 2005, and the survey
contains the necessary demographic data. Since the
dependent variable is measured as the average use
of non-financial information of all firms included in
a financial analyst’s portfolio, we, in a similar way,
compute LEV and SDR as the average leverage or
the average stock return variability of the firms
covered by each financial analyst. This approach
biases our research findings to some extent, but it is
also applied in other research areas.5
5. Research findings
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the use
of non-financial information which ranges from 0
(never used) to 4 (always used) – and for the
independent variables.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that financial analysts,
with a mean score of 2.46, rely on non-financial
information with a frequency ‘sometimes to often’.
However, the high standard deviation suggests a
wide variation in this usage. The mean scores on
analysts’ use of non-financial information range
from 1.06 (rarely used) to 3.77 (nearly always used)
suggesting significant differences in the importance
attached to the various information categories,
which is supported by anANOVA test. Our research
data demonstrate that financial analysts often use
background information about the firm (BI) and
forward-looking information (FWL). Information
about management and shareholders (MAN) and
intellectual capital information (IC) is used to a
lower extent. This result is surprising since
intellectual capital information is useful to assess
firm value (e.g. Barth and Clinch, 1998; Kallapur
and Kwan, 2004), but it confirms prior findings
from Johanson (2003) demonstrating that financial
analysts have their reservations about the validity
and the reliability of the reported IC information,
and about the impact of this information on future
cash flows. The use of IC disclosure is also
restricted by the reluctance of firms to report this
information publicly, increasing collection costs for
financial analysts (Dempsey et al., 1997). Our result
that the sample financial analysts only use informa-
tion about the management and shareholders occa-
sionally is remarkable, given the fact that such
information is largely disclosed by Belgian firms
(Orens and Lybaert, 2007), increasing the accessi-
bility of this information.
Panel B of Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for
the independent variables. The respondents of our
survey have, on average, 7.5 years experience in
analysing listed firms and follow, on average, eight
firms. The firm-specific determinants show a wide
variation in the portfolio of firms followed by each
financial analyst.
5.2. Multivariate regression results
We apply ordinary least squares (OLS) to test our
propositions about the influences of the firm-
specific and demographic determinants on the
analysts’ use of non-financial information. This
approach can be criticised because the dependent
variable, the average use of non-financial informa-
tion, is censored between 0 and 4 through the use of
ordinal data. However, alternative methods, such as
asymptotic methods, seem to be no option as these
create unreliable estimates with small sample sizes
(Noreen, 1988). Similar to Dempsey et al. (1997)
who have comparable data, we apply an OLS
regression. We control for heteroscedasticity by the
estimation of White’s robust standard errors. The
low levels of variance inflation factors (VIF)
indicate that multicollinearity is not present in our
data. The research results of the multivariate
analyses are provided in Table 3.
The research findings in Table 3 reveal that
financial analysts following higher leveraged firms,
and firms with greater stock return volatility,
employ significantly more non-financial informa-
tion. This finding suggests that the level of earnings
informativeness affects analysts’ use of non-finan-
cial information. Hence, we are able to support RP1
and RP2. This finding is consistent across all non-
financial information categories.
With regard to the demographic determinants, we
conclude that less experienced financial analysts,
and financial analysts covering more firms, use
more non-financial information. These findings
confirm RP3 and RP4. Breaking down non-finan-
cial information into various components, we
observe that the use of three non-financial informa-
tion categories, i.e. forward-looking information
(USEi,FWL), information about management and
shareholders (USEi,MAN) and background informa-
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4 This database contains accounting data of all firms operating
in Belgium that have filed their annual financial statement with
the Central Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of
Belgium.
5 Many studies in the international accounting literature use
mean scores on firm-specific variables in order to make
comparisons across countries. La Porta et al. (1997), for
instance, measure the median of the total debt to sales ratio for
all the firms in a given country. Chang et al. (2000) relate the
average size of the firms or the average ownership structure of
the firms in a country to the average number of financial analysts
following the firms in a country. Leuz et al. (2003) compute the
average earnings management score of the firms operating in a
country.
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tion about the company (USEi,BI), show a negative
association with financial analysts’ experience and a
positive association with financial analysts’ task
complexity.
6. Sensitivity analysis
Surveys are often criticised due to low response
rates, the impossibility of delving deeper into
responses, the possibility that respondents discuss
their answers with others, and the possibility that
responses do not reflect actual behaviour (Saunders
et al., 1997). To control for the reliability of the
survey results, we inspect the content of analysts’
reports written by the respondents in our study. This
approach overcomes the problem of subjectivity in
surveys, but it has the drawback that no conclusions
can be drawn as to whether financial analysts
include all information they use in their reports.
Limited space and competitive reasons restrict the
amount of information mentioned in an analysts’
report (Schipper, 1991; Rogers and Grant, 1997).
In particular, we study whether the frequency
with which items are mentioned in the analysts’
reports corresponds with the frequency of use
according to the survey results. We have selected
the analysts’ reports that were written during a
period of one year prior to the survey. In general,
two types of analysts’ reports exist: company
reports and result reports (García-Meca and
Martinez, 2007). We have examined company
reports only because, in these reports, financial
analysts present a fundamental analysis of the firm.
Such reports include a large amount of corporate
information, providing a detailed picture of a firm’s
activities and performance. Financial analysts how-
ever do not publish such reports on a regular basis.
Results reports are published frequently during the
year and include information related to a particular
event in a firm (e.g. an earnings announcement, the
introduction of a new product or an acquisition). We
have not researched these reports since they are
restricted in providing non-financial information.
This selection procedure results in 40 analysts’
reports written by 15 financial analysts that
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Panel A: Dependent variables1
USEi,TOT 2.46 1.06 3.77 0.56
USEi,ANA 2.39 1.27 3.64 0.61
USEi,FWL 2.99 1.55 4.00 0.66
USEi,MAN 1.91 0.17 4.00 0.90
USEi,BI 2.88 0.60 4.00 0.88
USEi,IC 1.91 0.65 3.45 0.52
Panel B: Independent variables
Characteristics of firms
LEVi 0.468 0.146 0.663 0.133
SDRi 0.089 0.033 0.138 0.027
Demographic characteristics of financial analysts
EXPi 7.45 1 26 4.88
NCOMi 8.23 2 15 3.73
This table provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables USEi,j: average use of non-financial
information by financial analyst i from the information category j, with j representing the average use of all
71 non-financial information items (TOT) and the average use of the five components of non-financial
information, i.e. the categories ANA (management’s analysis of financial and non-financial data), FWL
(forward-looking information), MAN (information about management and shareholders), BI (background
information about the firm) and IC (intellectual capital information) and for the independent variables LEVi:
average ratio of long- and short-term debt to total assets of the firms followed by financial analyst i; SDRi:
average standard deviation in daily stock returns of the firms followed by financial analyst i; EXPi: number
of years that financial analyst i performs his/her profession; NCOMi: number of firms followed by financial
analyst i.
1 The scores on the measurements of non-financial information use range from 0 (never used) to 4 (always
used).
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responded to our survey. We were unable to collect
analysts’ reports for all 31 respondents as we did not
gain access to the reports written by all these
financial analysts. The selected reports were issued
for 26 Belgian listed firms. Each report is researched
for the presence of the corresponding items
included in the survey. We allocated a score of 1
when a particular non-financial information item is
mentioned in an analysts’ report and a score of 0
otherwise. We observe that financial analysts
mainly disseminate forward-looking information
and background information, but hardly mention
intellectual capital information and information
about the management and the shareholders in
their reports. These findings support the survey
results. In addition, we obtain a significant positive
correlation between the mean score on each of the
71 non-financial information items based on the
survey results and the frequency that each item
occurred in the analysts’ reports (untabulated
results). Non-financial information elements being
used more frequently according to the survey, are
more frequently inserted in the analysts’ reports.
These findings allow us to conclude that the results
of our regression equation do not suffer from biases
in the measurement of the dependent variable.
We also control for additional determinants that
may affect the use of non-financial information by
financial analysts. First, we examine whether the
education level of financial analysts is related to the
use of non-financial information. Belgian financial
analysts have the opportunity to receive a specific
training organised by the Chartered Financial
Analysts Institute (CFA) or the Belgian
Association of Financial Analysts (BAFA).
Financial analysts are encouraged to take part in
these training programmes on a voluntary basis.
These courses enhance the knowledge and skills to
perform analyses of firms (Huber et al., 1993; Lee et
al., 2005). We propose that financial analysts who
took part in these courses rely more on non-financial
information to interpret financial statement infor-
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Table 3
Multivariate regression results of the analysts’ use of non-financial information on firm and
demographic characteristics
USEij Intercept LEVi SDRi EXPi NCOMi Adjusted
R²
F-value
USEi,TOT Coefficient 0.502 0.023 11.661 –0.947 0.066 35.9 5.205
**
T-value 1.005 3.302** 3.130** –2.640** 2.472**
USEi,ANA Coefficient 0.697 0.021 9.580 –0.623 0.039 16.6 2.493
*
T-value 1.148 2.505* 2.117* –1.430 1.222
USEi,FWL Coefficient 1.382 0.022 11.422 –1.317 0.074 26.4 3.685
*
T-value 2.227* 2.521** 2.468** –2.958** 2.236*
USEi,MAN Coefficient –0.809 0.026 13.202 –1.063 0.137 24.6 3.442
*
T-value –0.943 2.182* 2.064* –1.728* 2.991**
USEi,BI Coefficient 0.526 0.026 12.689 –1.049 0.085 35.9 5.197
**
T-value 0.919 3.274** 2.969** –2.552** 2.788**
USEi,IC Coefficient 0.552 0.017 9.242 –0.672 0.029 14.3 2.255
*
T-value 0.983 2.208** 2.209** –1.668 0.956
** significant on a 1% level; * significant on a 5% level (one-tailed), based on White (1980) corrected
standard errors.
This table provides the multivariate regression results of the following model:
USEij ¼ b0 þ b1 LEVi þ b2 SDRi þ b3 EXPi þ b4 NCOMi þ e
with USEi,j: average use of non-financial information by financial analyst i from the information category j,
with j representing the average use of all 71 non-financial information items (TOT) and the average use of
the five components of non-financial information, i.e. the categories ANA (management’s analysis of
financial and non-financial data), FWL (forward-looking information), MAN (information about
management and shareholders), BI (background information about the firm) and IC (intellectual capital
information); and with the independent variables LEVi: average ratio of long- and short-term debt to total
assets of the firms followed by financial analyst i; SDRi: average standard deviation in daily stock returns of
the firms followed by financial analyst i; EXPi: number of years that financial analyst i performs his/her
profession; NCOMi: number of firms followed by financial analyst i; ε: error term.
The scores on the measurements of non-financial information use range from 0 (never used) to 4 (always
used).
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mation. Our research findings (not tabulated) show
that financial analysts who have attended such
training programmes use more non-financial infor-
mation.
The size of the brokerage firm is the second
control variable which we associate with the use of
non-financial information. Demirakos et al. (2004)
show that brokerage houses differ in their prefer-
ences for using valuation models, such as dis-
counted cash flows or accounting-based economic
profitability models. Clement (1999) and Jacob et
al. (1999) emphasise that larger brokerage houses
employ more financial analysts and supporting
staff, resulting in larger and better networks for
collecting, disseminating and interpreting corporate
information. Additionally, larger brokerage firms
demonstrate a larger influence on capital markets
than smaller brokerage houses. As a result, man-
agers are more eager to provide voluntary informa-
tion to analysts employed by larger brokerage
houses. Both arguments suggest that analysts from
larger brokerage firms have better access to non-
financial information, which in turn may increase
the usage of this information (Dempsey et al.,
1997). Our research findings (not tabulated) show
that financial analysts employed at larger brokerage
houses do not employ significantly more non-
financial information than financial analysts
employed at smaller brokerage houses. We attribute
this result to the low variation in the number of
financial analysts operating in Belgian brokerage
houses.
Finally, we research whether the average firm
size and the proportion of firms with negative
earnings in the financial analysts’ portfolio affect
the financial analysts’ use of non-financial infor-
mation. Prior literature shows that the information
content of earnings is lower for small firms and loss-
making firms (Hayn, 1995; Vafeas, 2000; Petra,
2007), suggesting an increased need for financial
analysts to use non-financial information. However,
our findings (not tabulated) are unsupportive for
concluding that firm size and negative earnings
influence the analysts’ use of non-financial infor-
mation.
7. Conclusion
The current study provides insight into the drivers
of financial analysts’ use of corporate non-financial
information. Prior studies have found that financial
analysts consider the importance of non-financial
information in estimating value creation by firms,
but these studies do not focus on the context within
which financial analysts make the decision to use
corporate non-financial information.
Based on tentative propositions, our empirical
results show that financial analysts’ use of non-
financial information is negatively associated with
the firm’s earnings informativeness, proxied by the
risk indicators leverage and stock return volatility.
Financial analysts following firms with higher
leverage and higher stock return volatility use
more non-financial information than financial ana-
lysts covering firms with lower leverage or lower
stock return volatility in order to counter concerns
over higher risks and to capture underlying eco-
nomic events. These findings are consistent with the
two most important functions of financial analysts:
providing information to investors and monitoring
firm management. As earnings are less informative,
the importance of both functions increases. In order
to add meaning to the financial figures, financial
analysts use non-financial information to perform
both functions. Our empirical results also indicate
that the less experienced financial analysts, and the
financial analysts following a higher number of
firms, make more efforts to use corporate non-
financial information.
One important limitation of our study relates to
the small sample size, which restricts the general-
isation of our findings to other small continental
European countries. Additional research in both
code law and common law countries is necessary to
increase our knowledge regarding the determinants
affecting the financial analysts’ use of non-financial
information. Another limitation relates to the
application of mean scores in the association
between the use of non-financial information and
firm-specific determinants. In a future study, the
analysts’ use of non-financial information for each
individual firm separately could be examined
instead of averaging the use of non-financial
information across all firms covered by a financial
analyst.
Because theoretical evidence about determinants
of the use of non-financial information is scarce,
further research is necessary to elaborate this
research area. Our research propositions in this
respect could be used to develop hypotheses about
the drivers of analysts’ use of non-financial infor-
mation. Further research could also focus on the
information sources on which financial analysts rely
in collecting non-financial information. It is import-
ant to gain more insight into the extent to which
financial analysts collect non-financial information
privately. Such research maps the potential infor-
mation asymmetry between investors and financial
analysts. Future research can also focus on the
impact of financial analysts’ use of corporate non-
financial information on financial analysts’ esti-
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mates of a firm’s future cash flows and a firm’s
market value.
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